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CAMPBELL VS. HELLER:  
A NEW ANALYSIS OF THE 1978 ELECTION FOR 






In popular memory and most published accounts, the 
1978 election for South Carolina’s Fourth Congressional Dis-
trict represents “[t]he most serious incident of anti-Semitic in-
trusion in a South Carolina political campaign.”1 According to 
historians such as Jack Bass and Diane Vecchio, Republican 
candidate Carroll A. Campbell, Jr. used anti-Semitic tactics to 
defeat his Jewish opponent, Democratic candidate Max M. 
Heller. 2  However, this narrative misrepresents Campbell’s 
campaign strategy and ignores the political and economic fac-
tors that influenced the election. Using electoral data and con-
temporary newspapers, this study seeks to re-contextualize the 
1978 election within broader political trends. During a period 
when southern white conservatives were becoming disillu-
                                               
1 Jack Bass, “Just Like One of Us,” in A Portion of the People: 
Three Hundred Years of Southern Jewish Life, ed. Theodore 
Rosengarten and Dale Rosengarten (Columbia, SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 2002), 39. 
2 Jack Bass and W. Scott Poole, The Palmetto State: The Making of 
Modern South Carolina (Columbia, SC: University of South Caro-
lina Press, 2009), 154. Diane Vecchio, “Max Moses Heller: Patron 
Saint of Greenville’s Renaissance,” in Doing Business in America: 
A Jewish History, ed. Hasia R. Diner (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue 
University Press, 2018), 200. Vecchio says that the Campbell cam-
paign “crafted a strategy that relied on consistently reminding the 
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sioned with the Democratic Party, the Republicans saw an op-
portunity to challenge the open seat in the Fourth District. 
With an aggressive, well-funded campaign, Campbell suc-
cessfully branded Heller as a big-spending liberal who raised 
taxes and opposed protective tariffs for the local textile indus-
try. Campbell defeated Heller by 51,377 to 45,584 votes (52.1 
to 46.2 percent), becoming the first Republican since Recon-
struction to represent the Fourth District.3 
Unfortunately, the political reasons for Heller’s defeat 
faded from memory almost immediately after the election, as 
Heller’s supporters speculated that he had lost due to anti-
Semitism. Five days before the election, independent candi-
date Don W. Sprouse had declared that Heller was not quali-
fied to represent the largely Christian district because he was 
Jewish.4 At the time, Campbell condemned the remarks and 
several readers wrote to the editor of The Greenville News to 
denounce Sprouse. 5  After the election, however, Heller’s 
friends privately expressed their concern that voters had 
turned against him out of prejudice.6 His contacts in the Anti-
Defamation League even suspected that Sprouse had acted as 
                                               
3 South Carolina State Election Commission, Report of the South 
Carolina State Election Commission for the Period Ending June 
30, 1979 (Columbia, SC: State Election Commission, 1979), 56. 
4 Sally Saunders, “Sprouse Says Religion Makes Heller Unquali-
fied,” Greenville News (Greenville, SC), Nov. 3, 1978. Al Dozier, 
“Sprouse Attacks Heller Religion,” Greenville Piedmont (Green-
ville, SC), Nov. 2, 1978, Box 3, Folder 1, Max Heller Collection, 
Acc. 2011-066, Special Collections and Archives, Furman Univer-
sity, Greenville, SC. 
5 For Campbell’s response, see Saunders, “Heller Unqualified.” 
6 L.D. Johnson to Max and Trude Heller, Nov. 8, 1978, Box 1, 
Folder 6, Max Heller Collection, Acc. 2011-066, Special Collec-
tions and Archives, Furman University, Greenville, SC. Beth Israel 
Sisterhood to Max Heller, Nov. 13, 1978, Box 1, Folder 8, Max 
Heller Collection, Acc. 2011-066, Special Collections and Ar-




















a “stalking horse” for Campbell.7 A few years later, in the 
March 28, 1983 edition of his political newsletter, Washing-
ton-based Democratic analyst Alan Baron alleged that Camp-
bell was behind Sprouse’s attack. According to Baron, Camp-
bell had commissioned a poll, which indicated that voters 
would respond negatively to the information that Heller was 
“a foreign-born Jew who did not believe Jesus Christ was the 
savior.”8 Campbell then allegedly shared the poll results with 
Sprouse, who brought up Heller’s religion while Campbell 
stayed clean. Neither Heller nor Campbell had released their 
polls to the press during the 1978 race. After Democratic ac-
tivist Samuel Tenenbaum publicized Baron’s allegations dur-
ing Campbell’s 1986 gubernatorial campaign, Campbell re-
leased his poll, which did contain two questions related to 
Heller’s Jewishness, but without Baron’s wording.9  At the 
same time, Democratic consultant Marvin Chernoff claimed 
that Campbell’s friend and associate, Republican politico Lee 
Atwater, had admitted to sharing the poll results with 
                                               
7 Stuart Lewengrub to Max Heller, Nov. 22, 1978, Box 1, Folder 8, 
Max Heller Collection, Acc. 2011-066, Special Collections and Ar-
chives, Furman University, Greenville, SC. Stuart Lewengrub to 
Max Heller, June 6, 1986, Box 1, Folder 8, Max Heller Collection, 
Acc. 2011-066, Special Collections and Archives, Furman Univer-
sity, Greenville, SC. 
8 Alan Baron, The Baron Report, no. 173 (March 28, 1983): 2, Box 
6, Folder 2, Max Moses Heller Collection, Acc. #2009-076, Special 
Collections and Archives, Furman University, Greenville, SC. 
9 Arthur J. Finkelstein & Associates, Poll, Box 6, Folder 1, Max 
Moses Heller Collection, Acc. #2009-076, Special Collections and 
Archives, Furman University, Greenville, SC. Question #22 asks 
which phrases best describe Max Heller and Carroll Campbell. 
There are six choices, including “A Christian man” and “Jewish.” 
Question #25 asks voters which personal qualities would make 
them more or less likely to vote for a candidate. Among the fifteen 
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Sprouse.10 Although the criticism subsided after Campbell’s 
election as governor, the controversy haunted him for the rest 
of his career. When Campbell emerged as a possible running 
mate for Bob Dole in the 1996 presidential race, Tenenbaum 
used his connections with the Anti-Defamation League to en-
sure that Campbell was not selected.11 In this way, the anti-
Semitism allegations have come to dominate the memory of 
the 1978 election until the present day, so that the issues which 
the candidates actually debated have been forgotten. It is there-
fore important to return the election to its proper political con-
text. 
Campbell’s identification with the Republican Party 
should have placed him at a disadvantage in a historically 
Democratic state like South Carolina. Since Reconstruction 
the Democratic Party had created an unbeatable “juggernaut” 
that seemed able to perpetuate itself indefinitely.12 Southern 
Democrats had locked up the white vote by combining liberal 
spending policies with conservative positions on race, taxes, 
and unions.13 By contrast, the Republican Party represented 
the “waste, graft, and mismanagement” of Reconstruction and 
                                               
10 Al Dozier and Marilyn Rauber, “Consultant’s Allegation Links 
Campbell to ’78 Polling Scheme,” Greenville News (Greenville, 
SC), July 15, 1986. 
11 Bass and Poole, The Palmetto State, 154. See also David 
Twersky, “GOP Strategist May Have Injected Religion Into Past 
Campaign,” MetroWest Jewish News (New Jersey), July 25, 1996; 
James T. Hammond and Dan Hoover, “Dole Aides Talk to Demo-
crat Who Accused Campbell of Using ‘Political Anti-Semitism,’” 
Greenville News (Greenville, SC), Aug. 3, 1996; Matthew Dorf, 
“Possible Dole Running Mate Could Threaten Jewish Vote,” Daily 
News Bulletin, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (New York), Aug. 7, 
1996. 
12 Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of the Southern Republi-
cans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 46-48. 




















struggled to make inroads into the Democratic electorate.14 If 
Republicans contested seats at all, they fielded inexperienced 
candidates against a veteran Democrat. Incumbent Democrats 
were almost always reelected. 15  For example, the retiring 
Fourth District representative, James R. Mann (D-S.C.), had 
been elected to five consecutive terms, often by large mar-
gins.16 
By 1978, however, many southern white conserva-
tives no longer saw the Republican Party as a foreign enemy. 
Thirty years earlier, President Harry S. Truman had angered 
many racial conservatives when he began to advocate civil 
rights legislation. 17  As the presidential candidate for the 
States’ Rights Party in 1948, Senator Strom Thurmond (D-
S.C.) led a “psychological break from the national Democratic 
Party” in the South.18  White southerners who identified as 
Democrats declined from 78 percent in 1952 to 60 percent in 
                                               
14 Black and Black, Rise of the Southern Republicans, 41; Jack 
Bass and Walter Devries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: 
Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York: 
Basic Books, 1976), 13, 251. 
15 Ibid., 48. 
16 In 1968 Mann was elected to his first term, defeating Republican 
Charles Bradshaw by a total of 61,247 to 39,062 votes (excluding 
Laurens County). South Carolina State Election Commission, Sup-
plemental Report of the Secretary of State O. Frank Thornton to the 
General Assembly of South Carolina (Columbia, SC: State Election 
Commission, 1969), 20. In 1972 he defeated Republican Wayne N. 
Whatley by 64,989 to 33,363. South Carolina State Election Com-
mission, Report of the South Carolina Election Commission for the 
Period Ending June 30, 1973 (Columbia, SC: State Election Com-
mission, 1973), 573. In 1976 he defeated Robert L. Watkins (R) by 
91,711 to 33,149. South Carolina State Election Commission, Re-
port of the South Carolina Election Commission for the Period 
Ending June 30, 1977 (Columbia, SC: State Election Commission, 
1978), 30. 
17 Black and Black, Rise of the Southern Republicans, 207. 
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1960, while those who identified as Republicans rose from 
nine to 21 percent.19 Supported by a strong Republican organ-
ization in his home state of South Carolina, Thurmond for-
mally switched his allegiance to the Republican Party in 1964 
and openly campaigned for Barry Goldwater in the presiden-
tial race that year.20 Although he ultimately lost to Lyndon B. 
Johnson, Goldwater became the first Republican ever to sweep 
the Deep South, winning 55 percent of the southern white vote 
due to his opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 21  The 
Fourth District was split between Goldwater in Greenville 
County and Johnson in Spartanburg County.22 In 1968 Rich-
ard Nixon attempted to realign whites into the Republican 
Party, but the candidacy of segregationist George Wallace lim-
ited Nixon’s impact to only 40 percent of the white vote.23 
However, Nixon did win both Greenville and Spartanburg 
counties in the Fourth District.24 In 1970, during the desegre-
gation of the Greenville school system, Republicans won in 
Greenville County in the races for governor, lieutenant gover-
nor, and the state House. Greenville native Carroll A. Camp-
bell, Jr. was elected to the state House with 27,706 votes.25 
Without Wallace to take away votes in 1972, Nixon defeated 
liberal Democrat George McGovern with a platform of law 
and order and economic conservatism. He won again in both 
counties of the Fourth District. That year, Republicans won 
                                               
19 Black and Black, Rise of the Southern Republicans, 209. 
20 Bass and Devries, Transformation of Southern Politics, 24. 
21 Ibid., 28; Black and Black, Rise of the Southern Republicans, 
209. 
22 South Carolina State Election Commission, Supplemental Report 
of the Secretary of State to the General Assembly of South Carolina 
(Columbia, SC: State Election Commission, 1965). 
23 Black and Black, Rise of the Southern Republicans, 210. 
24 State Election Commission, Report (1969), 15. 




















four-fifths of the total southern white vote.26 Campbell was 
reelected to the state House with a record-breaking 41,296 
votes, while Thurmond won the U.S. Senate seat. Republicans 
also contested all six districts for the Greenville County Coun-
cil and won five of them.27 
Nixon’s involvement in the Watergate scandal and 
Jimmy Carter’s election temporarily arrested Republican ad-
vancement in the South, but Carter’s lack of progress in 
fighting inflation increased disillusionment among Demo-
crats. Watergate “severely embarrassed and discredited” the 
Republicans and by 1974 the percentage of white southerners 
who identified as Republicans had not increased from the 1960 
level.28 Riding on a wave of resentment towards the establish-
ment, Democratic outsider Charles D. “Pug” Ravenel pre-
sented a serious challenge to Republican James B. Edwards in 
the 1974 South Carolina governor’s race. Unfortunately for 
the Democrats, Ravenel was disqualified due to the residency 
requirement and the party nominated William Jennings Bryan 
Dorn, who lost narrowly to Edwards. Ravenel’s disqualifica-
tion and refusal to endorse Dorn left many South Carolina 
Democrats bitter and the party in disarray.29 Democratic hopes 
rose when Jimmy Carter ran as a “centrist” outsider in the 
1976 presidential election and won ten out of eleven southern 
states.30 However, as in 1964, the Fourth District was split, 
with Republican Gerald Ford winning Greenville County and 
Jimmy Carter capturing Spartanburg County. 31  President 
Carter’s inability to solve economic issues soon disappointed 
                                               
26 State Election Commission, Report (1973), 572-573; Black and 
Black, Rise of Southern Republicans, 210-211, 222. 
27 State Election Commission, Report (1973), 356-361. 
28 Black and Black, Rise of Southern Republicans, 210-211, 222. 
29 Bass and Devries, Transformation of Southern Politics, 270. 
30 Black and Black, Rise of Southern Republicans, 211. 
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many of his supporters among southern whites and conserva-
tive Christians. 32  After starting his presidency with an ap-
proval rating of 66 percent (Feb. 4-7, 1977), Carter’s rating 
dropped to 42 percent by June 16-19, 1978 and to 39 percent 
in early August.33 
The one constant during this period of political transi-
tion had been Democratic Rep. Mann’s perennial reelection as 
the representative of the Fourth District. This changed in Jan-
uary 1978, when Mann resigned his seat amid a financial scan-
dal. On January 2, 1978, Mann announced that he would not 
seek re-election for a sixth term. Although he did not explicitly 
state his reasons for stepping down, reporters speculated that 
his decision was related to accusations that he had used his 
congressional office staff to help a failing mail-order coin 
dealership, in which he was a principal financial backer. 34 
When the story first broke in spring 1977, Campbell was al-
ready being tapped as the Republican candidate to challenge 
Mann in 1978. He claimed that the story would not influence 
                                               
32 Black and Black, Rise of the Southern Republicans, 213-214. 
33 Gallup Organization, “Jimmy Carter Presidential Approval,” 
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, https://ropercenter.cor-
nell.edu/presidential-approval/. 
34 Associated Press, “Rep. Mann Announces Plans to End Career,” 
Index-Journal (Greenwood, SC), Jan. 3, 1978. In February 1977, 
The Washington Post reported that, in violation of congressional 
rules, Mann had loaned $38,000 to Ben Gause of US Coin Co. in 
Greenville, SC and had used his Washington staff to perform ser-
vices for Gause, such as affixing postage stamps to bills, ordering 
coins and bills, and shipping coins and bills from Washington to 
Greenville. Gause was found guilty of mail fraud for failing to fill 
nearly $250,000 in customer orders. This was particularly embar-
rassing for Mann, who served on the House Judiciary Committee 
and had gained national attention for his powerful speeches against 
Nixon during the televised impeachment proceedings. Rudy Maxa, 
“Rep. Mann Had Hill Aides Help Firm He Backed,” Washington 




















his decision to run against Mann, but he believed that the Re-
publicans had “an outstanding opportunity” to win. 35  The 
1978 election became an even better opportunity for Republi-
cans when Mann announced his retirement in January. Until 
then, Mann had been the “controlling influence” on the candi-
dates because they had to orient their campaigns to challenge 
him as the formidable Democratic incumbent. When he with-
drew from contention, the national Republican Party smelled 
blood in the water.36 This fit with their overall strategy for 
1978: instead of challenging incumbent Democrats, the Re-
publican Congressional Campaign Committee decided to con-
centrate its money and expertise on open seats. According to 
The State, the Committee was “pinning its hopes on Camp-
bell.”37 If he won the Republican primary, Campbell would 
have “the full backing, including a huge financial commit-
ment, of the national party.”38 Campbell easily secured this 
support by defeating Robert L. Watkins by 6,808 to 899 votes 
in the primary on June 13, 1978.39 His Democratic opponent 
would be Greenville mayor Max Heller, who had defeated 
Nick Theodore in a much closer contest by 25,295 to 22,319 
votes.40 
In order to win Mann’s seat, Campbell needed to at-
tract the district’s white conservatives who traditionally voted 
Democrat and would likely vote for Heller as Mann’s succes-
sor. Ordinarily, the lack of viable Republican opposition in 
open-seat contests in the South meant that a conservative 
                                               
35 Dale Perry, “Reaction Divided Along Party Lines,” Greenville 
News (Greenville, SC), March 1, 1977. 
36 Walter Julian, “4th District a ‘Target District,’” Greenville News 
(Greenville, SC), June 11, 1978. 
37 Lee Bandy, “Fourth District – A GOP Target,” The State (Co-
lumbia, SC), Jan. 15, 1978. 
38 Julian, “‘Target District.’” 
39 State Election Commission, Report (1979), 50. 
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Democratic challenger could easily pick up the retiring incum-
bent’s conservative support.41 However, the Democratic Party 
as a whole had become more moderate in the 1970s due to the 
defection of many conservatives and the addition of newly 
registered black voters who were more liberal.42 While Dem-
ocrats could still win as moderates, white voters preferred con-
servatives; therefore Republicans could defeat Democratic 
nominees who had failed to unite all wings of their party 
and/or who could be convincingly attacked as liberals or mod-
erates.43 Republicans could win open seats with “aggressive 
and well-financed” campaigns, in which they combined posi-
tive messages about themselves with “slashing negative at-
tacks against their Democratic opponents.” 44  Campbell 
adopted precisely such a strategy against Heller.  
Campbell’s main obstacle was Heller’s record as the 
popular mayor of Greenville, which he needed to convince 
                                               
41 Joseph A. Aistrup, The Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican 
Top-Down Advancement in the South (Lexington, KY: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1996), 122. 
42 Ibid. While these defections should not be overestimated (only 
30 percent of southern white conservatives identified as Republi-
cans in 1976), they did produce a growing number of independent 
voters. (Most Democrats became independents rather than Republi-
cans.) Between 1960 and 1976, the percentage of southern white 
conservatives identifying as independents increased from 18 per-
cent to 31 percent. Black and Black, Rise of the Southern Republi-
cans, 211. 
43 Black and Black, Rise of the Southern Republicans, 82, 172-173. 
Many moderate white southerners remained Democrats: in 1968, 
only 15 percent were Republicans, while 55 percent were Demo-
crats. The percentage of moderate white southerners who were Re-
publicans increased to only 24 percent in 1980. That said, moder-
ates did favor Republican presidents: Nixon (1972), Ford (1976), 
and Reagan (1980, 1984, and 1988). See Black and Black, Rise of 
the Southern Republicans, 230. 




















voters was that of a big-spending liberal, not a fiscal conserva-
tive. This was a difficult task. Heller’s August 1978 survey 
told him that voters viewed his mayoral record positively. 
“The voters are tired of waste and inefficiency in government. 
They’re looking for a good fiscal manager,” the survey report 
said. It recommended that he talk about “better management 
of tax dollars, cutting waste and inefficiency, and better plan-
ning to get the most from tax money.”45 Since Heller had a 
good track record, he “doesn’t need to be defensive about his 
record in office; he is not seen as a big spender. He should run 
on what he has done for fiscal management in Greenville and 
how he can do these same things in Congress.”46 
Campbell found one way to portray Heller as a liberal 
by targeting the mayor’s use of federal grants to condemn pri-
vate property and sell it to private developers. Campbell said 
he had “severe reservations” about this policy and considered 
it an “abuse” of the federal community development pro-
gram.47 “There are many things that are done in the name of 
public good,” Campbell said. “But it doesn’t do much for the 
people who have to move out to have the land resold at one-
third the value to developers who redevelop the land at a 
profit.”48 As an example, Campbell cited an urban redevelop-
ment project where privately owned homes along Webster 
Street and Webster Alley, a low-income area, would be torn 
down and the residents relocated. The property would be re-
sold at one-third the value to a private developer, who planned 
to build one thousand condominiums.49 Heller defended the 
                                               
45 Peter D. Hart Research Associates, “A Survey of the Political 
Climate in the Fourth Congressional District of South Carolina,” 
23, Box 1, Folder 1, Max Heller Collection, Acc. 2011-066, Special 
Collections and Archives, Furman University, Greenville, SC. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Sally Saunders, “Campbell Says Condemnation Procedure Is an 
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practice, saying that the federal community development 
money was used to eliminate slum housing in order to “give 
the residents the opportunity for more decent living condi-
tions.”50 All the property owners had been treated fairly in the 
Webster Street project, according to Heller. He said the project 
was part of an urban renewal program that included construc-
tion of a senior center, apartments for the elderly built by pri-
vate investors, and the rebuilding of one of the oldest churches 
in the state, which had been destroyed by fire.51 When some 
Greenville city officials also defended the program, Campbell 
responded that he felt he was fighting not against an individual 
candidate, but against “a small power group pretty much 
aligned with the city of Greenville.” He declared: “If my cam-
paign means I have to go against this downtown (Greenville) 
power group, then I’ll stand against them.”52 
Campbell labeled Heller as a “liberal” candidate who 
supported “big government spending” because the mayor had 
used federal money while also raising taxes.53 In March 1978, 
The Greenville News had reported that federal grants ac-
counted for more than 40 percent of the city’s budget, up from 
only 1.3 percent in 1969.54 The city’s downtown revitalization 
project, which was considered crucial to Greenville’s eco-
nomic future, was going to cost $25 million. Mayor Heller was 
instrumental in obtaining a $7.2 million grant from the federal 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to finance 
the city’s part of the project (the other part would be financed 
by private businesses). The grant request equaled almost half 
                                               
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Sally Saunders, “Campbell Says Foe Now Favors Tax Cut,” 
Greenville News (Greenville, SC), Sept. 26, 1978. 
53 Sally Saunders, “Campbell Rips Heller,” Greenville News 
(Greenville, SC), Oct. 18, 1978. 
54 Sally Smith, “City Woos Once-Shunned Grants,” Greenville 




















of the city’s annual budget.55 Campbell cited a March 1978 
Clemson University study prepared for the state legislature, 
which found that Greenville city residents paid the highest per-
centage of their income to property taxes of all cities in the 
state. “I find it inconsistent that my opponent says on one hand 
he wants a tax cut and a reduction in federal spending, and on 
the other, he has increased the local use of federal grant money 
along with increasing local taxes,” Campbell said.56 City taxes 
had increased twice under Mayor Heller. According to Camp-
bell, Greenville city residents now paid 7.92 percent of their 
income to city taxes, while the mean percentage for the state’s 
big cities was 5.02 percent and Spartanburg city residents paid 
only 4.6 percent. Because of the high taxes, Campbell said that 
about six percent of city residents had left Greenville.57 Camp-
bell also claimed that, while Heller had reduced the number of 
city employees, he had “not told the public how many employ-
ees have been added under federal programs supported by 
their taxes.”58 In fact, Campbell said, the city bureaucracy had 
increased 70 percent, including eighty-nine non-essential fed-
erally funded employees.59  
Campbell cited Heller’s opposition to the Kemp-Roth 
tax cut proposal as further evidence that Heller would not help 
the taxpayers if elected to Congress. Endorsed by Rep. Jack 
Kemp (R-N.Y.) and Sen. William Roth (R-D.E.), the proposal 
would cut federal taxes by 33 percent over a three-year period. 
Kemp advocated supply-side economics, a theory which holds 
that cutting taxes will ultimately lead to higher government 
revenue because of economic growth. As a Republican, 
Campbell supported the proposal, while Heller believed that a 
                                               
55 Ibid. 
56 Saunders, “Campbell Rips Heller.” 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 “Why Vote for Carroll Campbell for Congress,” Greenville 
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cut in federal spending should accompany the tax cut. In Au-
gust, Campbell said that the tax cut would “encourage savings, 
bring about lower interest rates and create jobs.”60 He did not 
think the tax cut would cause inflation because it was not cre-
ating money; reduced revenues would force the federal gov-
ernment to cut spending. He contended that inflation pushed 
taxpayers into higher tax brackets, while their real income did 
not increase. “The point is that the federal government is mak-
ing money from inflation,” he said, noting that government in-
come increased 1.5 percent with every one percent increase in 
inflation.61 On the other hand, Heller believed that the pro-
posal “sounded too liberal and could be highly inflationary.” 
“I won’t be part of a promise that can’t be kept,” he said.62 In 
August, Campbell claimed that Heller was “out of touch with 
the average taxpayer” in his opposition to the Kemp-Roth tax 
cut and challenged him to debate the issue. Heller did not an-
swer the charges, saying, “I don’t intend to comment every 
time he issues a press release.”63  In an October 5 speech, 
Campbell implicitly referred to Heller when he said that criti-
cism to Kemp-Roth usually came “from people who have 
backed big government spending programs their whole politi-
cal careers.”64 Addressing “those who piously stand up and 
say we have to cut spending before we cut taxes,” Campbell 
said, “They haven’t offered any specific proposals, and I can 
only assume that they would vote against the four tax cut bills 
                                               
60 Scott Sunde, “Campbell Calls for Broad Cuts in Income Taxes,” 
Greenville News (Greenville, SC), Aug. 10, 1978. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Allen Clark, “Campbell Radio Ads Urge Support for Tax-Cut 
Bill,” Greenville News (Greenville, SC), Aug. 16, 1978. 
63 “Heller Attacked on Taxes,” Greenville News (Greenville, SC), 
Aug. 17, 1978. 
64 Sally Saunders, “Heller, Campbell Debate,” Greenville News 




















in Congress this year because none of them carry spending 
cuts.”65 
Campbell also attacked Heller on one of the most sen-
sitive issues for the Fourth District: the failing textile industry. 
Approximately 58,000 people in the district depended on the 
textile industry for their livelihood. Mills Mill, one of Green-
ville’s oldest textile mills, reduced its work force by two hun-
dred in 1977 before announcing in August 1978 that it would 
cease operations by the end of the month, cutting the remain-
ing 136 jobs.66 Abney Mills closed six plants, including two in 
Greenville and four in Anderson County, with a loss of one 
thousand jobs. Burlington Industries closed Poe Mill in Green-
ville, with a loss of seven hundred jobs. In all, the mill closings 
resulted in more than two thousand jobs lost during 1977 and 
the first half of 1978.67 Mill owners cited tight labor conditions 
in the carded cotton yarn market, increased textile imports, and 
the estimated $3 billion cost of meeting the stricter Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OHSA) standard for 
the control of cotton dust in mills. Textile executives expected 
to see more closings once the new OHSA standard went into 
effect in September 1978.68 
The problems in South Carolina’s Fourth District re-
flected a wider trend in the South. According to data from the 
Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA), there was a 17 
percent loss of textile employment in the South from February 
1951 to July 1958, chiefly due to foreign imports.69 The textile 
                                               
65 Ibid. 
66 Ann Green, “Old Mill to Cease Operations,” Greenville News 
(Greenville, SC), Aug. 8, 1978. 
67 Scott Sunde, “More Mills May Face Shutdown,” Greenville 
News (Greenville, SC), Aug. 9, 1978. 
68 Green, “Old Mill to Cease Operations”; Sunde, “More Mills May 
Face Shutdown.” 
69 Timothy Minchin, Empty Mills: The Fight Against Imports and 
the Decline of the U.S. Textile Industry (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
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industry was particularly susceptible to import competition be-
cause it relied on low-wage, unskilled labor, which made up a 
large part of the production cost.70 Between 1952 and 1958, 
one hundred and fifteen plants closed in eleven southern states, 
and 31,855 workers lost their jobs.71 By 1968, textile imports 
made up one-third of the U.S. balance of payments deficit.72 
The country also entered a recession in the 1970s, when the 
post-World War II economic boom came to an end.73 Two 
hundred and forty-six more textile plants closed in the South 
between 1970 and 1979.74 The Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) 
of 1974, which allowed countries to enter into bilateral agree-
ments to restrict textile and apparel trade, failed to stem the 
tide of imports. Textile leaders and politicians pressured Pres-
ident Carter to renew the MFA in 1977 and keep his promises 
to protect the industry.75 In an effort to stop the bleeding, Sen. 
Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) and Rep. Ken Holland (D-S.C.) 
sponsored a bill that would prohibit U.S. trade negotiators 
from reducing textile tariffs at the ongoing Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations. Congress passed the bill in September 1978, but 
it awaited the president’s signature.76 In October, Sen. Hol-
lings met with Carter to urge him to sign the bill, but the pres-
ident was noncommittal. Most of Carter’s aides, including 
U.S. trade representative Robert Strauss, believed that the bill 
was “a protectionist piece of legislation that would prevent 
American negotiators from extracting concessions from their 
trading partners.” They urged him to veto it.77 
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Heller attempted to work with the Carter administra-
tion on the textile issue. On August 3, 1978, he traveled to 
Washington to meet with David Rubinstein, assistant to the 
president’s advisor on domestic affairs. He laid out a seven-
point plan to reduce the rate of inflation and create more jobs. 
The plan included a reduction of government regulations such 
as OHSA standards, special tax incentives to encourage busi-
nesses to promote exports, and an investment tax credit for any 
federally imposed expenditure for nonproductive equipment.78  
“The textile industry is faced with having to put in almost $1 
billion in equipment because of the brown lung situation,” 
Heller said. “There is no question in my mind that it is a legit-
imate problem…but the burden would be tremendous.” He 
said the proposals received “a very good response” and Rubin-
stein assured him his staff would look at them carefully.79 
When Mills Mill announced its closing a few days later on 
August 8, Heller sent a telegram to President Carter, urging 
him to “take action that will stop this loss of jobs. The textile 
import situation is hurting too many lives and companies. Any 
reduction in tariffs would be disastrous.”80 
By contrast, Campbell chose to criticize the Carter ad-
ministration for not protecting the textile industry. While 
cheap foreign imports were “costing Americans jobs and clos-
ing our mills,” President Carter was using the textile industry 
as a “pawn” in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations.81 Camp-
                                               
78 Karl Hill, “Heller Gives 7-Point Plan to Add Jobs, Cut Inflation,” 
Greenville News (Greenville, SC), Aug. 4, 1978. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Max Heller to President Carter, Aug. 8, 1978, telegram, Box 2, 
Folder 6, Max Heller Collection, Acc. 2011-066, Special Collec-
tions and Archives, Furman University, Greenville, SC. 
81 “Campbell Says Flow of Cheap Foreign Imports Must Stop,” 
Greer Citizen (Greer, SC), Aug. 16, 1978, Box 3, Folder 1, Max 
Heller Collection, Acc. 2011-066, Special Collections and Ar-








Furman Humanities Review 
 18 
bell said he was “appalled” that the administration had be-
trayed its “solemn promise not to bargain away the textile in-
dustry,” when textiles were “a part of our economy’s back-
bone.” 82  Campbell had written a section in the 1976 
Republican platform, asking the Carter administration to ex-
tend the existing MFA instead of including textiles in the Mul-
tilateral Trade Negotiations.83 He believed that an extension 
would have allowed the United States to work on bilateral 
agreements with individual nations. Campbell argued that, by 
including textiles in the negotiations, the Carter administration 
was using the textile industry as “a bargaining chip” that 
would cost American jobs.84 Like Heller, Campbell had sent a 
telegram to President Carter asking him to remove textiles 
from the negotiating table, but he did not receive a response. 
“I guess they throw them (telegrams) in the trash can,” said 
Campbell.85  
Campbell also linked Heller to the Carter administra-
tion, implying that Heller would not protect the district’s tex-
tile jobs in Congress. According to Campbell, Heller’s 
“friend” Robert Strauss proposed cutting tariffs on imports by 
an average of 60 percent during the next eight years. “This 
would cause the loss of 500,000 United States textile jobs, 
with a ripple effect in related industries creating losses totaling 
two million jobs by 1990,” Campbell said. “That’s what this 
administration is pushing for.”86 Yet Heller had “shown sup-
port for administration policy” and recently urged that 
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Strauss’s office be allowed to handle all negotiations concern-
ing textile imports and tariffs.87 In spite of Heller’s vehement 
denials, Campbell continued to claim that Heller supported the 
textile tariff reductions. On November 5, two days before the 
election, Campbell took out a full-page advertisement entitled 
“The Piedmont Textile Worker: Can His Job Survive?” The ad 
says that “Heller’s friend” Strauss is “working full-time to re-
duce textile tariffs, which will eliminate textile jobs.”88  It 
shows how Carter has failed to protect American textile work-
ers’ jobs from unfair imports. “The textile industry is vital to 
the people of South Carolina,” the ad says. “It is estimated that 
5,000 jobs in the Greenville-Spartanburg district alone will be 
endangered unless the Hollings-Thurmond bill is signed.”89 
The ad concludes: “We must have a foreign policy that puts 
America and American workers first…A vote for Carroll 
Campbell is a vote for American jobs.”90 
Heller generally showed reluctance to respond in kind 
to Campbell’s attacks, which allowed Campbell to control the 
narrative of the election. For example, in September, Camp-
bell announced that Heller had switched positions on the tax 
cut issue. Their disagreement over the tax cut “was one of the 
major differences between myself and Max Heller,” Campbell 
said. “But I’m glad we got him over on our side.”91  Both 
Campbell and Heller reacted positively in October when the 
House voted to back a Senate plan calling for a massive tax 
cut if federal spending was restrained.92 Campbell referred im-
plicitly to Heller when he said that the Senate bill “has even 
received support from some liberals who have been opposing 
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tax cuts of more than $20 billion. Obviously these liberals 
found it politically expedient to change tunes with the election 
so near.” Heller maintained that the Senate bill was “com-
pletely different” from the Kemp-Roth proposal, which he had 
earlier opposed. 93  Although they supposedly now agreed, 
Campbell still criticized Heller for not proposing any specific 
alternatives to cutting taxes. “It’s just a smoke screen – you 
make a very general statement about cutting taxes and spend-
ing but when, where, how are you going to cut taxes?”94 
Campbell attributed other positions to Heller. For instance, 
during an October 5 debate at a meeting of the Spartanburg 
Development Association, Campbell said, “I support tax cred-
its for businesses who hire the structurally unemployed. I’m 
sorry Max opposed that.”95  According to reporters, Heller 
jumped to his feet and exclaimed, “I didn’t say that.” “If you 
didn’t say that I stand corrected,” Campbell replied. “Don’t 
put words in my mouth,” Heller snapped. After Heller ex-
plained that he did not oppose the tax credits, Campbell said, 
“Well, I’m glad you cleared that up.”96 Campbell also accused 
Heller of “waffling” because he opposed collective bargaining 
and striking by public employees yet supported a state-spon-
sored negotiating mechanism for public school teachers. 97 
Heller complained that Campbell was “trying to put words in 
my mouth. And I am perfectly capable of speaking for my-
self.”98 He explained that he did not believe public school 
teachers should strike, but they needed some kind of mecha-
nism to negotiate their contracts. Campbell insisted that Heller 
had a “double standard” and was “playing with semantics.”99 
                                               
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Saunders, “Heller, Campbell Debate.” 
96 Ibid. 
97 Sally Saunders, “Campbell Hits Heller Record on Taxes, Use of 






















Campbell made a similar argument when he launched his at-
tack on Heller’s use of federal money in Greenville. He 
claimed Heller had “vacillated on the issues” because he sup-
ported both government cutbacks and “big government spend-
ing” in his administration.100 “Saying one thing and doing the 
other is not the way to operate,” said Campbell. He accused 
Heller of using “one ruse or another” rather than taking a stand 
on the issues.101 Heller’s campaign did not immediately re-
spond to Campbell's attack, while Campbell claimed that Hel-
ler had referred to him as a “parrot” that spouted off figures. 
Campbell repeated his accusation that Heller was avoiding the 
issues, but Heller told reporters, “I don’t think Mr. Campbell’s 
comments deserve a response.”102 Finally, Campbell created 
the impression that Heller was a political novice. “There is no 
time for on-the-job training with unchecked inflation, tremen-
dous tax burdens and 58,000 textile jobs in the district at 
stake,” Campbell told Spartanburg voters. It was not enough 
to be a nice person and tell people that it is what is in your 
heart that counts. “People have got to know where you stand,” 
he said.103 
In the last few weeks of the campaign, Heller at-
tempted to regain control over the electoral discourse, but he 
faced an uphill battle. In September, he hired Washington-
based political consultant Mark Shields to help with advertis-
ing, but he did not begin television and radio ads until late Oc-
tober. By contrast, Campbell had already spent about $11,500 
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on television advertising and about $2,100 on radio advertis-
ing between July and September.104 Campbell had also raised 
more money than Heller during the same three-month period. 
He started July with $12,089 on hand and added another 
$54,967 by the end of the quarter, for a total of $67,056.105 
Much of this money likely came from Campbell’s fund-raising 
event with Ronald Reagan in late September. Hundreds of 
people attended the $50-a-person reception and $10-a-person 
barbecue, raising $18,000 to $20,000 for Campbell’s cam-
paign.106 Meanwhile Heller began the quarter with no cash on 
hand and raised $47,054, which included his own $15,000 
loan to the campaign and $32,054 in contributions.107 
On October 18, the same day that Campbell attacked 
Heller’s use of federal money and increase in taxes, Shields 
wrote to his candidate: 
There can be little argument that Mr. Campbell is 
presently dominating the dialogue of this campaign. For en-
tirely laudable reasons, you are reluctant to attack Campbell. 
But, in the absence of any press initiatives from your cam-
paign, you are left in the position of either responding or not 
responding to Campbell’s attacks. And let us also note that 
Campbell has been shrewd enough to drop his two major po-
litical bombshells in the Spartanburg media market where half 
the undecided voters reside and your record as Mayor is not 
that widely known.108 
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Shields advised Heller to campaign on his mayoral 
record “in an aggressive and imaginative way that underlines 
and emphasizes the very real differences between you and 
Campbell.”109 Heller’s team must “think and breathe press for 
the next three weeks.” At press conferences and other public-
ity events, Heller could speak about his record as mayor and 
refute Campbell’s claims, which were based on a “very royal-
ist view of government.” Shields believed that most South 
Carolinians found this view “abhorrent and decidedly contrary 
to American tradition.”110 
Following Shields’ advice, Heller issued press re-
leases to answer Campbell’s accusations. Heller acknowl-
edged that the number of state employees in Greenville had 
increased by 229 percent in the seven years since he became 
mayor, but the number of city employees decreased from 738 
to 617 during the same period. Of the 108 federally paid em-
ployees, only nineteen would become full-time city employees 
if federal funding stopped.111 He also said that Campbell mis-
understood the purpose of federal money, which was “to im-
prove our community and enrich the lives of our people.”112 
While federal money was indeed “the hard-earned tax dollars 
of the working men and women of South Carolina and the 
United States,” it was also an investment back into the com-
munity. 113  Heller emphasized the positive results he had 
achieved for Greenville. He had reduced the city debt by al-
most half and increased the city surplus to $4.2 million. He 
had built playgrounds and community centers, paved roads, 
improved housing, increased street lighting, improved garbage 
collection, and strengthened law enforcement. 114 Moreover, 
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Heller said that Campbell’s statements about the increase in 
city taxes were “misleading.” The Clemson study included 
county taxes and school taxes and did not account for inflation. 
While the tax rate in the city had increased 18 percent since 
1971, the inflation rate had increased 51 percent. “Those are 
facts,” Heller said. “Facts we can be proud of.”115 He also 
called Campbell’s statement about the city’s population de-
crease “grossly unfair” because the numbers did not tell “the 
whole story.” In fact, Heller said, the number of households in 
the city had increased even if the total population had declined. 
He concluded by dissociating himself from Robert Strauss on 
the textile issue.116 
Then suddenly, just as Heller was working to recover 
lost ground, independent candidate Don W. Sprouse inter-
jected his religious views into the race. On November 2, five 
days before the election, Sprouse declared that Heller “has not 
made clear to the voters he is not a Christian and that there is 
a difference between Christians and Jews.”117 Referring to an 
October 25 debate, during which Heller had spoken about the 
common heritage and traditions of Christianity and Judaism, 
Sprouse said that he wanted to emphasize the difference be-
tween Heller and himself. “He cannot turn to Jesus Christ in 
time of need,” said Sprouse. “He doesn’t believe Jesus Christ 
has come yet.”118 As a non-Christian, Heller was “not as qual-
ified to represent the Christian people of the district as a Chris-
tian congressman.”119 Sprouse’s remarks produced mixed re-
actions, with both the Heller and Campbell camps believing 
that they had suffered damage. Campbell’s press secretary 
Mike Ussery regarded Sprouse’s remarks as a “devastating” 
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blow to Campbell’s campaign. 120  Campbell worried that 
Sprouse would take away votes from him out of sympathy for 
Heller. Indeed, several people wrote to the editor of The 
Greenville News, denouncing Sprouse’s comments, while oth-
ers wrote to Heller to express their disgust with Sprouse and 
their support for Heller. “I thought I’d lost the race because of 
that,” Campbell recalled in May 1986.121 
Contrary to Campbell’s fears, Sprouse did not receive 
enough votes to determine the outcome of the election. Camp-
bell defeated Heller by a margin of 5,893 votes, while Sprouse 
received only 1,693 (1,126 in Greenville County and 567 in 
Spartanburg County). On the precinct level, the number of 
Sprouse’s votes sometimes exceeded the margin of Camp-
bell’s victory, seemingly suggesting that Sprouse took these 
votes away from Heller. However, Sprouse had adopted an 
even more conservative stance than Campbell, for instance ad-
vocating a fifty percent tax cut, and therefore likely drew the 
votes from Campbell instead of Heller. At any rate, Sprouse 
received no more than thirty-seven votes in any one precinct. 
Most political observers predicted that Campbell would do 
well in Greenville County, and he did, winning by 32,061 to 
27,273 votes (a margin of 4,788).122 But Campbell also took 
half of the precincts in the city of Greenville, which indicated 
that at least some of Heller’s mayoral constituents had become 
dissatisfied with his performance. On October 31, Campbell 
had campaigned in Heller’s “back yard,” visiting merchants 
and salespeople along Main Street in downtown Greenville. 
They complained to him about the construction and blocking 
of Main Street as part of the downtown redevelopment pro-
gram and pledged their votes to him. “You won’t have any 
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trouble down this street,” said one merchant.123 In perhaps the 
biggest shock of the night, Campbell won the traditionally 
Democratic county of Spartanburg by 19,316 to 18,211 votes 
(a margin of 1,105).124 “We’re amazed, floored by Spartan-
burg County,” said Ussery. “Our whole strategy had been 
predicated all along on losing big in Spartanburg County.”125 
Campbell was ecstatic. “I took Spartanburg County,” he 
shouted to his supporters after the returns came in.126 Heller’s 
team was likewise in shock. “I’m stunned,” said John Rubin, 
Heller’s campaign manager. “Everything had said we were 
okay.”127 It seems that Heller’s reliance on his mayoral record 
and good character had lulled his supporters into a sense of 
complacency. 
While we do not have demographic data for the No-
vember election, Heller’s August 1978 survey indicates that 
there was fertile ground for Campbell to plant seeds of doubt. 
For example, Heller did not receive as much support as a Dem-
ocrat should have from younger voters and blue-collar work-
ers, the latter mainly Spartanburg residents.128 Forty-nine per-
cent of voters aged 18-34 said they supported Heller strongly 
or with some reservations, while 40 percent supported Camp-
bell, and 11 percent were undecided. Forty-four percent of 
blue-collar whites supported Heller strongly or with some res-
ervations, while 38 percent supported Campbell, which was 
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impressive for a Republican, and 18 percent were undecided. 
Campbell also had 38 percent support among middle-income 
white voters, which was the group most concerned about gov-
ernment spending.129 Forty-six percent of Spartanburg County 
voters supported Heller strongly or with some reservations, 25 
percent supported Campbell, and 29 percent were unde-
cided.130 Conservative voters made up 42 percent of the sam-
ple electorate, and 38 percent of these said they would vote for 
Campbell. Undecided voters comprised 20 percent of the sam-
ple electorate and over half of them lived in Spartanburg 
County. The survey report recommended that Heller target 
these older, low-informational voters.131 When asked to re-
spond to the statement, “Max Heller would be too much of a 
big spending liberal,” fifty percent of voters disagreed, but 34 
percent were not sure.132 When asked to respond to the state-
ment, “Max Heller has done a good job of holding down gov-
ernment spending in Greenville,” fifty-one percent of all vot-
ers agreed, while 41 percent were not sure. More concerning, 
only 35 percent of Spartanburg County voters agreed with this 
statement, while 62 percent were not sure. Among undecided 
voters, thirty-three percent agreed, with 62 percent not sure.133 
The numbers indicated that “these voters will have to be sold 
on the job that Max Heller has done as mayor and will do as 
congressman.”134  Campbell’s aggressive strategy prevented 
that from happening. 
As we have seen, the open seat in South Carolina’s 
Fourth District and the general disillusionment of conserva-
tives with the Democratic Party provided an ideal opportunity 
for the Republican Party in the 1978 election. With the full 
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support of his party, State Sen. Carroll A. Campbell, Jr. chal-
lenged the popular mayor of Greenville, Max M. Heller, for 
the seat. The two candidates fought a closely contested race, 
debating issues such as government spending, federal tax cuts, 
and textile tariffs. In order to win crucial conservative votes, 
Campbell frequently labeled Heller as a liberal who raised city 
taxes, spent federal money, and opposed tariffs to protect the 
local textile industry. He also criticized Heller’s political inex-
perience and lack of specific proposals. With Heller reluctant 
to strike back, Campbell dominated the narrative of the elec-
tion with his own interpretation of Heller’s views. At the last 
minute, independent candidate Don Sprouse attempted to “ex-
pose” Heller’s Jewish beliefs to the Christian voters. Sprouse 
received more rebukes than votes for his trouble, while Camp-
bell’s strategy paid off at the polls on election day. It was un-
doubtedly a painful loss for Heller and his supporters. Unfor-
tunately, the political reasons for his defeat have been largely 
forgotten, as historians and journalists have chosen to focus on 
the unsubstantiated allegations that Campbell used Sprouse as 
a “stalking horse” against Heller. As a result, a great deal of 
important political history has been lost. The 1978 election 
took place during a time when South Carolina was transition-
ing from a solidly Democratic to a two-party state. Campbell’s 
victory represented a milestone for the Republican Party in its 
mission to become the new party of conservatism in the South. 
 
 
  
